The moral relevance of empathy is highly contested. Some argue that it is of little or no moral worth because of its proneness to personal bias, stereotypes, and lack of connection to altruistic behavior. Others contend that particular definitions of empathy are morally relevant in virtue of empathy's causal role in caring or altruistic behavior. In light of this discussion, I develop an important distinction between empathic practice, which is morall neutral, and empathic attunement, which identifies empathic practices done excellently. Further, equipped with four conditions of empathic attunement, I argue that empathic attunement is a virtue. However, unlike other accounts of empathy's moral worth, I maintain that its worth lies not in its causal connections to caring and altruistic behavior. Rather, the virtue of empathic attunement lies in its unique way of respecting, caring for, and connecting with others. In this way, empathic attunement is a distinct and important character trait that demonstrates, and is crucial to, human flourishing.